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Excuses, Moral and Legal: A Comment on Marcia Baron’s ‘Excuses, Excuses’ 
R A Duff 
 
 
 
Marcia Baron has offered an illuminating and fruitful discussion of extra-legal excuses. What 
is particularly useful, and particularly important, is her focus on our excusatory practices—on 
the ways and contexts in which we make, offer, accept, bestow and reject excuses: if we are 
to reach an adequate understanding of excuses, their implications and their grounds, we must 
attend to the roles that they can play in our human activities and relationships—and to the 
complexities and particularities of those roles. 
 However, I want to focus my comments less on the details of Baron’s discussions of 
excuses in extra-legal contexts than on the implications of her discussion for our 
understanding of excuses in the criminal law. What light (if any, a sceptic might add) can 
such analyses of our extra-legal concepts and practices throw on legal concepts and 
doctrines? 
 
 
1. Moral and Legal Exculpation 
 
Baron believes, as do many other theorists, that ‘the concepts of justification and excuse 
should function in law at least roughly in the way they do in everyday life’.1 Some such belief 
is certainly right: if the criminal law is to be justified in condemning and punishing as 
                                                                                                                                           
1  Baron 2006: n. 1 (future bare references in the text will be to this article). 
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wrongdoers those who commit what it defines as crimes, its crimes must be genuine, 
unjustified wrongs, and it must allow those who commit them to avoid conviction and 
punishment by offering an appropriate justification or excuse for their conduct. However, we 
need to distinguish three claims that could be involved in such a belief. 
 The first claim is that the factors which exculpate in our extra-legal moral practices 
should, at least in principle, also exculpate in the criminal law: that the kinds of factor that 
make it morally inappropriate or unjust to blame or condemn someone for what he has done 
should make it legally inappropriate to convict him of a criminal offence. Subject to various 
qualifications that recognise the practical obstacles in the way of any attempt to translate 
moral principles directly into legal doctrine, this claim is surely right. If I unintentionally 
cause damage to another’s property through non-culpable ignorance, mistake or accident; or 
if I damage it intentionally but only because this was the only way to avert some much 
greater harm, or because I acted under a threat that I could not reasonably have been expected 
to resist: I deserve neither moral condemnation for an act of moral wrongdoing nor legal 
condemnation for an offence of criminal damage. 
 The second claim is that the exculpatory concepts of justification and excuse used in 
criminal law should, at least in principle, be intelligible as formalised, perhaps modestly 
adapted versions of the exculpatory concepts of justification and excuse as used in extra-legal 
moral contexts. This claim is surely also right, although care is obviously needed in 
negotiating some of the conceptual minefields that surround these concepts—in particular the 
question of whether the justification of an action, in either moral or legal contexts, depends 
on the reasons for which the agent acted, or only on the reasons that were available for acting 
thus.2 To put matters very roughly, an action is justified if, though it is of a kind that we 
                                                                                                                                           
2  A question on which Baron herself has thrown useful light: see Baron 2005. 
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normally have good or even conclusive reason not to do, in the particular context that reason 
is cancelled or outweighed; an action is excused if, though it is one that in the particular 
context there was conclusive reason for the agent not to do, there are factors about the context 
or the agent given which it would be unfair to condemn her for acting thus (I say a little more 
about this in s. 2 below). Put even more roughly, an agent whose action is justified does not 
act against the balance of reasons that bear on her situation; one whose action is excused does 
act against the balance of relevant reasons, but does so non-culpably. 
 The third claim is that those exculpatory concepts of justification and excuse should, at 
least in principle, have the same application or extension in criminal law as they do in extra-
legal moral contexts: that what counts as a justification, or as an excuse, in those moral 
contexts should also count as a justification, or as an excuse, in the criminal law. This claim 
might seem to follow from the first two, but it does not; indeed, I will argue in s. 3 that it is 
false, and that its falsity throws some useful light on the contrasting structures of criminal and 
moral responsibility. 
 Before developing that argument, however, I should comment very briefly on some 
aspects of Baron’s discussion of excuses in moral contexts. 
 
 
2. Moral Excuses 
 
Baron offers us some salutary reminders of the rich complexity of our excusatory practices 
and discourse. One of her own examples suggests that matters might be even more complex 
than she recognises. 
 She talks about cases in which ‘civility calls for offering an excuse for one’s conduct 
even though one believes that one was justified’ (at n. 11) as when I apologise to my 
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departmental chair for being late for a meeting because I ‘couldn’t get away’ from the teacher 
who wanted to talk to me about my son. It is not clear, however, that this is a case of offering 
an excuse as distinct from a justification (as her ‘though’ implies). That I say ‘I’m sorry’ does 
not constitute it as an excuse as distinct from a justification: that could be a polite expression 
of regret that I ‘had to’ justifiably inconvenience him. That I say ‘I couldn’t get away’ does 
not constitute it as an excuse as distinct from a justification: that ‘could’ is the ‘could’ of 
what I had or did not have good enough reason to do, not of what it was or was not within my 
power to do—I couldn’t reasonably get away. I do not deny that we would naturally talk of 
my offering an excuse, or making my excuses, in such a case; but I do not think that we are 
then talking of excuse as something in tension with the belief that I was justified in acting as I 
did. We should, instead, recognise that alongside the specific use of ‘excuse’ as something 
distinct from justification, we also use ‘excuse’ as a quite general term of exculpation, to 
cover what in other contexts or other tones we might count as justifications as distinct from 
excuses. This is true both inside and outside the criminal law. The Criminal Damage Act 
1971, s. 1, defines the basic offence of criminal damage as destroying or damaging another’s 
property ‘without lawful excuse’, and it is clear from s. 5 of the Act that ‘lawful excuse’ 
includes justifications. Similarly, a student’s ‘excuse’ for missing a class might be that he was 
ill in bed; but unless the illness was such as to incapacitate him completely, what he offers is 
a justification —that one is permitted to miss classes when ill. 
 It is also true, as Baron rightly emphasises, that we are interested in the demeanour or 
style of exculpatory pleas as much as in their substantive content: as a matter of ‘civility’, I 
offer excuses, but claim justifications; my demeanour might thus be excusatory, when I ask 
for a recognition of the relevant exculpatory factors rather than asserting them or claiming 
them, whilst the content of my plea might still be unambiguously justificatory. My point here 
is only that given the dual use of ‘excuse’—in a broad sense that includes justificatory 
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exculpations and a narrower sense that excludes them—we must take care not to classify as 
non-justificatory excuses what are actually offered and understood as justificatory pleas. 
 What then identifies excuses, as distinct from justifications? Baron initially identifies 
three factors, all of which figure in familiar accounts of excuses: each merits brief comment 
here. 
 First, an excuse admits ‘that what the agent did was wrong, or at least untoward’.3 The 
‘or at least untoward’ qualification is important, since even when we are dealing with excuses 
that avert moral blame as opposed to other kinds of criticism, and that thus respond to or seek 
to ward off an accusation of moral wrongdoing, excuses sometimes negates wrongdoing. If 
my excuse for doing you some serious and intentional harm is that I acted under a kind of 
pressure (from human threat or from natural circumstances) that I cannot fairly be blamed for 
not resisting, we could say that I have an excuse for the commission of what is still a serious 
moral wrong—even if the excuse also changes the character of that wrong. But if my excuse 
for knocking over and breaking your vase is that I did not realise (and could not have been 
expected to realise) that it was there, or that I was non-culpably pushed against it, the excuse 
negates any wrongdoing: an intentional or careless act of destroying your vase would have 
been wrong, but we should not say that of a non-culpably inadvertent or accidental breakage.4 
Any adequate account of excuses will have to attend to such differences in their operations 
and implications—which makes it hard to offer a general account of excuses that will be both 
substantive and sufficiently inclusive. We can say, however, as a way of unifying the diverse 
                                                                                                                                           
3  Or ‘bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible ways 
untoward’; Austin 1961: xxx-x, quoted by Baron in s. 6. 
4  As we will see in s. 3, matters are different in the criminal law: criminal excuses 
presuppose a criminal wrong. 
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kinds of untowardness that Austin mentions, that an excuse presupposes that the agent acted 
as she had conclusive reason not to act: for even when I accidentally break the vase, it is still 
true that I performed an action (I broke the vase) that I had conclusive reason not to perform.  
 Second, Baron agrees that ‘to excuse past conduct is to say that it would be unfair to hold 
the wrongdoer responsible for the action’ (at n. 18). This is, I think, true only of some 
excuses. It is true of such excuses as insanity or infancy, which in effect deny that the person 
was, at the time of the relevant action and in relation at least to that action, a responsible 
agent at all. However, it is not true of many of the excuses that Baron discusses: as we will 
see more clearly in s. 3, to offer an excuse of duress or other kinds of pressure, or even of 
non-culpable inadvertence or accident, is to admit responsibility for the action that is 
excused. This difference between excuses such as insanity and excuses such as duress—that 
the former negate whilst the latter admit responsibility —explains why some legal theorists 
distinguish ‘excuses’ from ‘exemptions’ (e.g. Gardner 1998; Tadros 2005: 124-9): an agent 
who can plead (or on whose behalf others can plead) insanity is exempted from responsibility 
for his actions; an agent who pleads non-justificatory duress as a defence is offering an 
excuse for an action for which she admits responsibility. 
 Third, what grounds an excuse is that it was ‘extremely difficult’ for the agent not to 
commit the action in question: difficult either because of some peculiarity of the agent or 
because of some feature of her situation that would make it extremely difficult for most 
people not to act thus (s 1). This can, I suspect, be made true of all excuses only by stretching 
the idea of ‘extremely difficult’ so far that it loses substantive content. We could indeed 
properly talk of how difficult it would be for someone acting under serious threat or serious 
pressure to avoid committing a crime—of how difficult it is both to deliberate clearly about 
what to do and to act in accordance with the outcome of any deliberation; but it is less 
illuminating to say that we should excuse the person who acts in non-culpable ignorance of 
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relevant facts, or the person who is suffering an all-embracing mental disorder, because it was 
difficult for them to avoid acting as they did—though we might say in all these cases that the 
agent is excused because for one of a variety of possible reasons we could not reasonably 
have expected them to avoid acting as they did. Nor indeed do excuses that seek ‘to thwart an 
inference from one’s conduct to one’s character or to one’s sentiments’ (s. 6.2) happily fit 
Baron’s initial picture: what can thwart such inferences need not be the difficulty of acting as 
one should. This reinforces Baron’s own concluding remark (s. 12) that ‘[o]ne thing is clear: 
the classification of excuses that I sketched in my opening section is too narrow to cover all 
excuses’. 
 I want to turn now to a contrast between moral and criminal excuses that Baron notes (s. 
12), but whose significant implications she does not explore. 
 
 
3. Excuses and Responsibility 
 
Moral excuses include such factors as non-culpable ignorance or mistake of fact, and 
accident: if I knock your vase over and break it, I can avert moral blame for that destructive 
action by pointing out that I did not realise, and could not reasonably have been expected to 
realise, that it was there, or that I (non-culpably) slipped or was pushed; in so doing, I offer 
an excuse for that action. Now I am also innocent of an offence of criminal damage if one of 
those factors obtained; but they do not function in law as excuses. Once we distinguish, as 
many theorists recognise that we should, offences from defences, we also see that mistake of 
fact and accident normally serve to negate the mens rea, as an essential element of the 
offence (since the damage is not then caused intentionally or recklessly). By contrast, excuses 
come into play only when all the elements of the offence have been proved: an excuse is a 
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type of defence, which wards off criminal liability for the commission of an offence; under 
English criminal law I need a excuse for damaging your vase only if it can be proved that I 
damaged it intentionally or recklessly, i.e. neither through non-culpable ignorance or mistake, 
nor by non-culpable accident.5 
  It might be tempting to pass off this difference either as simply a lawyers’ quirk (or 
misuse) of language, or as reflecting the formal procedural features of the criminal trial, but 
that would be a mistake: this difference in what counts as an ‘excuse’ as between extra-legal 
moral contexts and the context of the criminal law displays a deeper and more significant 
difference in the ways in which moral and criminal responsibility are constructed; in 
recognising that difference, we will also realise that excuses do not typically deny 
responsibility, understood as answerability. 
 To excuse my action is to admit I had conclusive reason not to act as I did—that I acted 
either against a categorical, indefeasible reason, or against the balance of reasons; but to 
plead that I could not reasonably have been expected to act in accordance with either that 
categorical reason or the balance of reasons—which is to say, since the expectation that is 
involved here is clearly a normative one, that I cannot reasonably be condemned for failing to 
act thus. To offer an excuse is thus to admit responsibility, but deny liability: I admit to 
committing an action for which I must now answer, but seek to block the otherwise legitimate 
transition from responsibility to liability (liability, in this context, to moral criticism or 
blame) by offering an exculpatory answer. To offer an excuse is thus to present myself not 
                                                                                                                                           
5  This is not the place for a detailed explanation or defence of the distinction between 
offences and defences; but see generally Fletcher 1978: 552-79, 683-758; Campbell 1987; 
Gardner 2004; Tadros 2005: 103-15. For some classic scepticism about the distinction, see 
Williams 1982.  
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just as a responsible agent, operating within the realm of reasons, but as an agent who is 
responsible for that which he seeks to excuse.6 
 Now in moral contexts responsibility is typically ‘strict’: I must answer for the harm that 
I actually cause by my actions, even if I was in no way at fault in causing it. If my answer is 
suitably exculpatory, I am not liable to moral blame for causing that harm: moral liability is 
typically non-strict—it depends on fault. The excuse (or justification) that I offer, however, 
serves not to negate responsibility, but rather to block the transition from responsibility to 
liability. That is why non-culpable ignorance, mistake and accident constitute excuses in 
moral context. In a system of criminal law that is structured both by the Presumption of 
Innocence and by the slogan that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, by contrast, matters 
are very different. It is for the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed the offence, 
i.e. to prove both actus reus and mens rea, before she has anything to answer for in a criminal 
court. She might in fact, if she is to avoid conviction, have to offer an answer to the charge: if 
the prosecution offers good evidence that I intentionally or recklessly damaged your vase, I 
might have to offer contrary evidence if the fact finder is to have any reasonable doubt about 
my guilt. But until the prosecution has proved that I did intentionally or recklessly damage 
your vase, there is nothing for which I am criminally answerable, which is to say that until 
the prosecution has discharged that probative burden I need neither a justification nor an 
excuse. What I am criminally answerable, i.e. responsible, for is not merely damaging your 
vase, but damaging it intentionally or recklessly: that is why non-culpable ignorance, mistake 
and accident are excuses in moral contexts, but not (usually) in criminal law. 
                                                                                                                                           
6  For more on the conception of responsibility on which I rely here, and on the distinction 
between responsibility and liability, see Duff 2003 and 2005. Note that this implies that, as 
I suggested in s. 2, insanity should be seen not as an excuse but as an exemption. 
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 The qualifying ‘usually’ in the previous sentence is crucial: for sometimes the criminal 
law does make responsibility strict. This phenomenon is distinct from the much discussed 
(and widely criticised) phenomenon of strict criminal liability, i.e. the imposition of criminal 
liability without proof of relevant fault, and raises quite different questions. It is found when 
offences are defined in such a way that the prosecution does not have to prove mens rea as to 
all aspects of the actus reus: instead, once the prosecution has proved the actus reus (and, 
perhaps, mens rea as to some aspects of that actus), the onus then shifts to the defendant to 
offer evidence, or even to prove (on the balance of probabilities) the absence of what we 
would normally count as mens rea if he is to avert conviction. Sometimes this is done by 
defining the offence in ‘strict’ terms, but allowing a ‘defence’ of due diligence or lack of 
criminal purpose or knowledge;7 sometimes it is done by the creation of a rebuttable 
presumption which allows or requires the fact finder to presume full mens rea on the basis of 
proof of the actus reus and some aspect of the mens rea, unless the defendant can prove or 
adduce evidence of lack of mens rea.8 In both kinds of case, however, the effect is that the 
defendant must answer for something less than the commission of an actus reus with full 
mens rea; which is to say that even if criminal liability is not strictly strict (since it can be 
averted by evidence or proof of lack of mens rea), criminal responsibility is strict. 
 These features of our criminal law raise two large questions. First, if moral responsibility 
is typically strict, why should criminal responsibility so often be non-strict?9 Second, if 
                                                                                                                                           
7  See e.g. Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, ss. 5(2), 28(2); Food Safety Act 1990, ss. 8(1), 21(1); 
Terrorism Act 2000, s. 57.  
8  See e.g. Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, s. 2; Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75. 
9  Given the sheer number of offences for which criminal responsibility in, for instance, 
English law is now strict, it could be misleading to say that criminal responsibility is 
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criminal responsibility is properly so often non-strict, how (if at all) can it sometimes be 
justifiably strict (a question distinct from, and in some ways more interesting than, the more 
familiar question about the justifiability of strict criminal liability)? I cannot pursue these 
questions here, but we can draw two important messages about excuses from what we have 
seen so far. The first is that if we treat responsibility as answerability, and distinguish it 
properly from liability, we can see that excuses admit, rather than deny, responsibility. The 
second is that even if the concept of excuse should have roughly the same meaning in 
criminal law as it has in extra-legal moral contexts; and even if the kinds of factor that can 
ward off moral blame for what we have done should also, in principle, preclude criminal 
liability: that is not to say that factors which constitute or ground moral excuses should also, 
even in principle, constitute or ground excuses in criminal law; it is rather to say that the 
structures, and thus the logics, of both inculpation and exculpation are significantly different 
as between the criminal law and extra-legal moral practices. Any adequate discussion of 
excuses in criminal law will have to attend to their role and meaning in moral contexts—a 
task to which Baron’s paper makes an important contribution; but it will also have to attend 
to these structural differences. 
                                                                                                                                                  
typically non-strict; but it is typically non-strict for those kinds of malum in se crimes that 
are still—for better or worse—salient in public conception and theoretical discussion. 
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